### 1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 2 IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 3 Chapter 11 proceedings In re COLLEGE PROPERTIES 4 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a limited Case No. 02-05-10095-CGC and 5 Case No. 02-05-15155-RJH partnership, 6 In re COLLEGE PROPERTIES II, an UNDER ADVISEMENT DECISION Arizona limited partnership, **RE: SECOND APPLICATION FOR** 7 APPROVAL AND PAYMENT OF Debtors. COMPENSATION AND 8 REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES TO STEGALL, KATZ & WHITAKER, P.C. 9 AS ATTORNEY FOR GENERAL **PARTNER** and 10 THE MONTAGE PARTIES' APPLICATION FOR AN AWARD 11 AND PAYMENT OF THEIR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 12 FROM THE NON-SETTLING PARTY **FUNDS** 13 14 15 I. **Introduction and Background** 16 Stegall, Katz & Whitaker, P.C. ("Stegall"), counsel for General Partner, Thomas 17 D'Ambrosio, has filed a second application for attorneys' fees of \$7,825.00 and costs of \$198.00. 18 Montage Industries, Inc. and Casa del Oro Development, L.L.C. (collectively "Montage Parties") 19 have filed a first application for attorneys' fees of \$11,673.50 and costs of \$31.45. Anthony 20 DePetris and Patricia Palmer (collectively "DePetris and Palmer") filed objections. 21 The facts are largely undisputed. In January 2007, Thomas D'Ambrosio, Black Mountain 22 Homes and others entered into a global settlement agreement entitled, "Settlement Agreement and 23 Comprehensive Release" ("SACR"). The Court approved SACR in February 2007. DePetris and 24 Palmer were not parties to the settlement, electing instead to opt out in order to continue to pursue

Soon after the BAP ruling in August 2007, both Stegall and Osborn Maledon, P.A.

their claims. DePetris and Palmer appealed the Court's approval of the SACR to the BAP. The

appeal was dismissed as moot on August 14, 2007 because, in the absence of a stay, distributions

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had been made under the SACR.

("Osborn"), counsel to Trustee Brian Mullen, filed applications for fees incurred in successfully defending the appeal to the BAP, relying upon paragraph 5 of the SACR which provides for post-settlement fees to be paid from the dissenting partner's settlement share.<sup>1</sup> DePetris, Palmer and others objected. The Court determined in separate written decisions dated November 13, 2007 that an award under paragraph 5 of the SACR was appropriate and that the Court retained jurisdiction over fee awards to professionals employed by the estate. Accordingly, the Court approved the fee applications of Osborn and Stegall.<sup>2</sup>

DePetris and Palmer appealed the BAP's dismissal order to the Ninth Circuit. Before the matter was heard, DePetris and Palmer filed a motion to dismiss, noting that the parties had not come to terms regarding attorneys' fees and costs. Stegall filed a consent to dismissal, noting that fees would not be sought at the circuit level but reserving its rights to pursue fees in the bankruptcy court. The Montage Parties consented to dismissal, noting that fees would not be sought at the circuit level but making no reservation of rights. DePetris and Palmer's motion to dismiss was granted and signed by the Clerk of the Court of the Ninth Circuit. Neither Stegall nor the Montage Parties filed a fee application with the Ninth Circuit.

Stegall and the Montage Parties now seek fees and costs in this Court under paragraph 5 of SACR. Stegall's application is limited to fees incurred in connection with the appeal to the Ninth Circuit; the Montage Parties, having not previously applied, seek all fees and costs incurred in connection with the BAP and Ninth Circuit appeals. DePetris and Palmer object on the grounds that Stegall and Montage did not file the appropriate motions with the Ninth Circuit and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to award fees. The Court agrees with DePetris and Palmer regarding fees incurred in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. However, consistent with its previous rulings the Court finds that it has the ability to award fees incurred in the appeal to the BAP.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Paragraph 5 of the SACR states, in part, "Non-Settling Parties need to recognize that if the [general partner] or any other party is successful in defending the claims, such parties shall have a claim to recover attorneys's fees and costs from the Non-Settling Party Funds."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Such The Court made certain deductions from the fees requested.

# II. Discussion

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## A. Ninth Circuit Fees

Fee awards in the Ninth Circuit are governed by rule. In the absence of a transfer from the Circuit, the district court is not authorized to rule on a request for appellate attorneys' fees. *Cummings v. Connell*, 402 F.3d 936, 947-48 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005). Under Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6<sup>3</sup> ("Rule 39-1.6") an appellate party must request attorneys' fees within fourteen days after the expiration of the period for rehearing. The party requesting fees must also support its request with a memorandum, showing that the party is legally entitled to fees accompanied by the appropriate form. "The deadline is strictly enforced." Circuit Advisory Committee Note to Rule 39-1.6 (citing to *Mollura v. Miller*, 621 F.2d 334 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980)).

As an alternative to filing a Rule 39-1.6 motion, under Ninth Circuit Rule  $39-1.8^4$  ("Rule 39-1.8") a party may file a motion to transfer consideration of attorneys' fees "to the district court . .

# (B) Contents:

A request for an award of attorneys fees must be supported by a memorandum showing that the party seeking fees is legally entitled to them and must be accompanied by Form 9 (appended to these rules) or a document that contains substantially the same information, along with:

- (1) a detailed itemization of the tasks performed each date and the amount of time spent by each lawyer and paralegal on each task;
- (2) a showing that the hourly rates claimed are legally justified; and
- (3) an affidavit or declaration attesting to the accuracy of the information. All applications must include a statement that sets forth the application's timeliness. The request must be filed separately from any cost bill.

<u>Request for Transfer</u> Any party who is or may be eligible for attorneys fees on appeal to this Court may, within the time permitted in Circuit Rule 39-1.6, file a motion to transfer consideration of attorneys fees on appeal to the district court or administrative agency from which the appeal was taken.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Rule 39-1.6 states:

<sup>(</sup>a) <u>Time Limits</u>: Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, a request for attorneys' fees shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) days after the expiration of the period within which a petition for rehearing may be filed, unless a timely petition for rehearing is filed. If a timely petition for rehearing is filed, the request for attorneys fees shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) days after the court's disposition of the petition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Rule 39-1.8 states:

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. from which the appeal was taken." Here, neither Stegall or the Montage Parties filed a motion under either rule.<sup>5</sup>

Stegall and the Montage Parties argue that the Ninth Circuit rules do not apply because they are requesting fees solely under paragraph 5 of the SACR, not under Rule 39-1.6. Despite this argument's surface appeal, it does not stand up under Ninth Circuit authority. No matter the underlying authority for an award of fees (whether by statute, rule, contract or, as here, a court approved settlement agreement), the procedural rules established by the Ninth Circuit apply. A request for attorneys' fees based on contract requires the request to be timely filed under Rule 39-1.6 or a request for transfer to be timely filed under Rule 39-1.8. Hobson v. Orthodontic Centers of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1795731, \*1-\*2 (E.D.Cal. 2007). The case law confirms this result; the Ninth Circuit, and District Courts in the Circuit, have held that a timely request under either Rule 39-1.6 or Rule 39-1.8 is a prerequisite for a hearing on a motion to award fees. See Cummings; Hobson; Arulampalam v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying a motion for fees requested pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") as untimely that was mailed before the deadline, but filed after the deadline); Al-Harbi v. I.N.S., 284 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that a fee application filed within 30 days of the final judgment as allowed by the EAJA was timely); CSL, L.L.C. v. Imperial Bldg. Products, Inc., 2006 WL 3526924 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (concluding that it may not award fees incurred on appeal to the Ninth Circuit without a transfer under Rule 39-1.8); Martin v. Nickels and Dimes, Inc., 804 F.Supp. 83 (D.Hawaii 1992) (finding that absent a transfer under Rule 39-1.8 a district court does not have jurisdiction to hear an application for fees incurred on appeal).

The mandate to file with the Ninth Circuit is found within the rule itself. Rule 39-1.6 begins with the phrase "[a]bsent a statutory provision to the contrary, a request for attorneys' fees shall be filed." Here, there is no statutory authority permitting a fee application to be approved by this Court. Under the plain meaning of the rule, a request for fees or a request to transfer must be made to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Such a transfer to the District Court would then be subject to the general order of referral to the Bankruptcy Court. General Order 01-15 (1), United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Ninth Circuit. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to award fees incurred in an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

B. BAP Fees

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1.6 is an outgrowth of FRAP Rule 39, 9th Cir. BAP R. 8014-1 ("Rule 8014-1") is an outgrowth of

FRBP 8014, which itself is based on FRAP Rule 39. See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 8014

(1983). Pursuant to Rule 8014-1, "[c]osts under FRBP 8014 are taxed by filing a bill of costs with

the clerk of the bankruptcy court" (emphasis added). Further, Ninth Cir. BAP R. 8018(b)-1 ("Rule 8018(b)-1") states that "[i]n cases where Part VIII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and

these rules are silent as to a particular matter of practice, a Panel may apply the Rules of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure" (emphasis added). In awarding fees incurred in a BAP appeal, this Court is left with the challenge

of determining what Rule 8014-1, Rule 39-1.6, and Rule 8018(b)-1 require in this context.

The Court concludes that reading the rules as a whole, a bankruptcy court is given the

authority to award attorneys' fees incurred on appeal to the BAP. Importantly, Rule 8014-1(b) establishes that costs are taxed through a filing with the clerk of the bankruptcy court. Although the

rule is silent on the issue of fees, this is a clear message that the BAP intends costs to be administered by the bankruptcy court, not by the BAP. Moreover, the BAP is not bound by Rule

39-1.6. Through the use of the word "may," the application of any Ninth Circuit rule is left to the

discretion of the BAP Panel when Part VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules is silent; thus, it is not

compulsory. Here, there is no suggestion in the BAP's order that it intended to invoke the Ninth

The Court has previously ruled that the BAP attorneys' fees incurred by Osborn and Stegall

The Court must determine if it has jurisdiction to award fees incurred on appeals to the Ninth

were recoverable under paragraph 5 of the SACR. The Court revisits its earlier decision because

Circuit BAP. In doing so, the Court looks to the rules of the Ninth Circuit BAP. Much as Rule 39-

DePetris and Palmer have now offered alternative grounds to deny the fee applications.

Circuit rule on attorneys' fees in this case. Thus, it is apparent to this Court that nothing in the Ninth

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Circuit rules, BAP rules, FRAP or FRBP specifically limits the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts

award fees under Paragraph 5 of the SACR for attorneys' fees incurred in defending the appeal to the BAP.

to determine BAP attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the Court finds that it does have the authority to

# C. Effect of the Motions to Dismiss

Stegall, Montage Parties and DePetris and Palmer each filed pleadings relating to dismissal by the Ninth Circuit. DePetris and Palmer argue that the Montage Parties waived their right to request attorneys' fees from all appeals, including to the BAP, via the language in their consent to dismissal. In the consent, the Montage Parties notified, "the Court that they will not seek fees or costs in connection with the appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." The Montage Parties contend that this statement means only that they would not seek fees and costs in the Ninth Circuit, not that they were waiving their right to seek fees and costs from this Court.

The Court finds that the Montage Parties did not waive their right to seek attorneys' fees from this Court for the BAP related fees. First, The Ninth Circuit granted DePetris and Palmer's motion and issued it as the mandate of the court. Accordingly, DePetris and Palmer's statement that "there are no agreements between the parties specifying how costs are to be paid," was the position accepted by the Ninth Circuit. Second, even if this Court were to adopt the position that the Montage Parties should be bound by their statement in their consent, it only referred to seeking fees in the Ninth Circuit. Finally, the Montage Parties affirmatively reserved their right to seek fees from this Court during the October 16, 2007 hearing regarding Osborn's Third Fee Application. Thus, the Montage Parties have not waived their right to seek fees from the Court which relate to the BAP appeal.

## D. Review of the Fee Applications

Based on the foregoing, the Court does not have jurisdiction to award fees incurred on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. But the Court does have the jurisdiction to award fees incurred on the appeal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Order was issued by the Motions Attorney/Deputy Clerk pursuant to 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. R. 27-7. Under the rule the Ninth Circuit delegates authority to staff attorneys, deputy clerks and others the authority to decide certain motions.

to the BAP. The Court previously ruled that fees incurred in preparing a fee application are not within the contemplation of Paragraph 5 of the SACR. Accordingly, fees incurred in preparing fee applications will not be awarded. The Court has reviewed the fee applications of Stegall and the Montage Parties accordingly.

# 1. Stegall

The Court has reviewed Stegall's billing and expense statements and finds that all of the fees and costs requested relate to the period after the dismissal of the BAP appeal. Those fees and costs are denied for the reasons stated above.

# 2. Montage Parties

The Court has reviewed the Montage billing and expense statements and finds that the fees and costs incurred by the Montage Parties between February 27, 2007 and August 15, 2007 are related to the BAP appeal and further finds the amounts requested to be reasonable. However, the fees and costs incurred after August 15, 2007 are all related to the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the Court awards fees incurred on appeal to the BAP of \$8,206.50 and costs of \$10.50 and denies the remaining fees and costs.

#### III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Stegall's application for attorneys' fees and grants Montage Parties' fees in the amount of \$8,206.50 and costs of \$10.50. Counsel for Montage Parties is to lodge a form of order consistent with this decision for the Court's signature.

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**DATED**: May 19, 2008

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CHARLES G. CASE II
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

**COPY** of the foregoing mailed by the BNC and/or sent by auto-generated mail to:

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28

1	Clifford B. Altfeld
2	Altfeld Battaile & Goldman 250 N. Meyer Avenue
3	Tucson, Arizona 85701-1090 Special Counsel to Trustee
4	Brian J. Mullen P.O. Box 32247
5	Phoenix, Arizona 85064 Chapter 11 Trustee
6	-
7	James E. Cross Brenda K. Martin Ochorn Moladon BA
8	Osborn, Maledon, PA 2929 N. Central Avenue, 21st Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2974
9	Attorneys for Brian J. Mullen, Trustee
10	Charles T. Stegall Loren I. Thorson
11	Stegall, Katz & Whitaker, PC 531 E. Thomas Road, suite 102
12	Phoenix, Arizona 85012-3239 Attorneys for Tom D'Ambrosio
13	•
14	Charles J. Kelhoffer Tamlyn E. Lewis Geoffrey M. Khotim
15	Ridenour, Heinton, Kelhoffer, Lewis & Garth, PLLC 201 N. Central Avenue, Suite 3300
16	Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Attorneys for Montage Industries, Inc.,
17	Black Mountain Homes, LLC and Casa del Oro Development, LLC
18	-
19	Randy Nussbaum Kevin J. Rattay Jaburg & Wilk, PC
20	3200 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2440
21	Attorneys for Montage Industries, Inc., Black Mountain Homes, LLC and
22	Casa del Oro Development, LLC
23	Joseph T. Stewart Law Office of Joseph T. Stewart
24	1100 E. Washington Street, Suite 200 Phoenix, Arizona 85034-1090
25	Attorneys for Anthony DePetris and Patricia Palmer
26	
27	
28	